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Welche Macht darf es denn Sein? Tracing ‘Power’ in German Foreign Policy 
Discourse 
Felix Berenskötter, SOAS University of London 
Holger Stritzel, King’s College London 
 
Introduction 
This article examines different uses of ‘power’ in the discourse on German foreign 
policy, specifically their deployment as role conceptions for a united Germany. It 
picks up observations by Gunther Hellmann (2002; 2006; 2013; 2016) and others 
(Roos 2012; Roos and Rungius 2016) that German foreign policy discourse and 
practice has slowly but steadily moved towards accepting ‘power’ as part of its 
role identity. This is a significant departure from characterisations of German 
foreign policy prominent in the 1980s, which attributed Germans a ‘forgetfulness 
of power’ and even a ‘fear of [having] power’ (Schwarz 1985; Schöllgen 1993). Of 
course, role images are very broad and do not capture the intricacies and 
complexities of foreign policy decision-making and practices. And yet, they matter 
precisely because, as simplified representations, these images function as mental 
shortcuts that purport to capture the character and core features of a state and its 
behavior in international relations (Holsti 1970).  The aim of this article is to take 
a closer look at the development of the role image of Germany as a particular kind 
of power, which necessarily entails an understanding of Germany having power, 
or being powerful in a particular way.  
 
Specifically, the article sketches the evolution through the use of three prominent 
conceptions – constrained/tamed power, civilian power and hegemon/hegemonic 
power – and the recent emergence of a new one – shaping power. Using the notion 
of ‘basic concepts’ as an analytical frame, the article reviews how these labels have 
emerged as popular categories in the German foreign policy discourse to give 
meaning to Germany’s position in international relations. We discuss their appeal 
from a historical and aspirational angle, as well as their instability and contested 
nature. While the discourse on German foreign policy encompasses many voices, 
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this article focuses primarily on influential writings of scholars working at the 
intersection of academic and policy world who address not only an academic 
audience but also intervene in and (seek to) shape the broader political discourse. 
As such, we look primarily at what might be considered the academic innovators 
and promoters of these images, less at the extent to which they are adopted by 
government officials. Only in the case of the most recent expression, the 
Gestaltungsmacht, which has yet to form into a solid image, we also look at 
treatments in documents published by the German government. 1 
 
Tracking the discursive deployment and evolution of the concept of ‘power’ in this 
way is first and foremost a descriptive stocktaking exercise. Yet, it allows us to 
draw out three important observations: First, these role images have an important 
normative function and so their formulation is aimed at advancing a particular 
image Germany wants (not) to be seen as. Second, notions of being a certain type 
of ‘power’ are often characterized by the prefix attached to them, which places the 
focus on particular kinds of resources and practices. Little attention has been paid 
to the concept of power as a relational form, expressed in terms of being exercised 
and recognized, which limits the analytical value of these labels. Third, we suggest 
that ‘shaping power’ has the potential to establish itself as a new basic concept and 
role identity for Germany if it is distinctively defined as a form of ‘power with/to’ 
that can be contrasted with a form of ‘power over’, which for historical reasons 
has a negative connotation both in Germany and amongst its neighbours.   
  
Framework  
Role Images as Basic Concepts 
Central to our analysis is that the role images used in the discourse on German 
foreign policy are not mere labels but concepts.2 A concept is an abstract frame 
that helps generating knowledge about the (our) world by organising, naming and 
giving meaning to particular aspects of that world. Following Koselleck, a ‘basic 
concept’ [Grundbegriff] plays a central role in our socio-political language and is 
                                                        
1 Our approach here overlaps with a recent article by Maull (2018). However, Maull is himself a 
prominent participant in the discourse and ultimately concerned with defending the label he 
coined. Thus, he also is a subject of our analysis. 
2 For a detailed discussion of concepts, which informs this section, see Berenskoetter (2017). 
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considered ‘indispensable to any formulation of the most urgent issues of a given 
time’ (Koselleck 1996: 64). It is a leading term [Leitbegriff] of our vocabulary that 
attempts to categorize and grasp important features of the world we experience 
and live in. As such, it is used as a keyword [Schlüsselwort] and a slogan 
[Schlagwort] by major social, economic and political organisations and 
movements and their ideologies, but also plays an important role in scholarly 
analysis as a core term in major theories (Koselleck 2011 [1972]: 8). Thus, basic 
concepts operate in both socio-political and academic discourse. In the former 
realm they guide thought and action of individuals and collectives across society 
and function as ‘categories of practice’ (Brubaker and Cooper 2000: 1). In the 
latter realm basic concepts are used as central analytical categories in logical 
reasoning and in guiding empirical study.  
 
To capture this overlap, this article looks primarily at writings by academics that 
seek to introduce or shape a basic concept not simply for scholarly analysis but 
for the wider discourse on German foreign policy. Tracing these writings can take 
two forms: a more descriptive approach that reconstructs how a concept has 
developed over time, or a decidedly critical angle that shows the political effects 
of conceptual language. We limit ourselves to the first approach. That said, we go 
beyond a mere description of when particular readings emerge in also assessing 
why they did, thus considering the purpose, or function, of a basic concept, which 
touches on its performative aspects.  
 
Reconstructing the evolution of a concept in foreign policy discourse requires 
some analytical bearings. As Koselleck (2011 [1972]) highlights, the ability of 
basic concepts to guide thought and action is due to their temporal structure 
containing a stock of experiences and an aspirational outlook, that is, to its ability 
to raise ‘innovative expectations’. Their formulation always takes place against a 
meaningful historical background, whereas the aspirational aspect points to the 
normative content of a concept/role in two ways: by projecting an image that the 
actor wants to become and ‘live up to’ and by raising behavioral expectations 
associated with that image. This makes them political. More generally, basic 
concepts gain meaning, are stabilized and contested within a particular socio-
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political context. For the role images of states, this context encompasses both the 
internal (domestic) and the external (international) realm, and so the emergence 
and evolution of role images, including their temporal content, must be 
understood within these contexts. 3  
 
Crudely put, conceptual change occurs, first, through the loss of plausibility of 
existing concepts which cannot grasp new or unexpected events and experiences 
and, second, through the strategic usefulness of a new concept, supported by its 
ability to absorb diverse perspectives and an intuitive resonance (for a more 
nuanced discussion, see Steinmetz 2007: 188-191). One might say that demand 
for new conceptual language arises when circumstances change, when an actor 
finds itself in unfamiliar circumstances. However, change in language does not 
simply follow and adjust to material changes or new practices. Concepts are 
invented and promoted, which in the realm of foreign and security policy is a 
decidedly political act. This is particularly relevant if we keep in mind their 
aspirational/normative quality. As Koselleck famously put it, concepts are not 
only indicators of but also factors in change, which in turn implies that concepts do 
something. They have a performative side. In guiding the thinking and behaviour 
of actors and organisations and, thus, influencing decisions, actions and social 
relations, an emerging concept is implicated in bringing about the change it 
‘describes’. There is no simple causal logic at play. In the case at hand, this means 
that a new image of Germany as a particular kind of ‘power’ does not simply 
emerge because commentators recognize that an existing image insufficiently 
captures the state’s material configuration and its foreign policy practices. Rather, 
because of their prescriptive quality, a new role image may be promoted 
domestically and/or internationally to pressure the government to change the 
basic premises of German foreign policy.4  In short, new concepts are created to 
both capture and bring about change. 
 
                                                        
3 On the concept-context link more generally, see Berenskoetter (2017); on the relational nature 
of role images, see McCourt (2014), chapter 1. 
4 On the relevance of the domestic political system for the process of “role selection and 
contestation”, see Brummer and Thies (2015). 
 5 
Finally, we adopt the view that basic concepts and the role images in which they 
are embedded evolve gradually. This is in line with the view that the language and 
practices associated with a particular identity are difficult and slow to change. It 
also takes into account that post-war German foreign policy has shown resistance 
to radical change, expressed in the governments’ proclamation of ‘continuity’ as a 
core principle. Analytically, this means we should observe the stretching of 
popular concepts as well as links to and overlaps with new concepts, rather than 
swift replacements. 
 
Power as a Basic Concept 
Few would dispute that ‘power’ is a basic concept. And from Hans Morgenthau’s 
comprehensive treatment in Politics Among Nations to Joseph Nye’s writings on 
‘soft power’, scholars of International Relations (IR) have long tried to speak to 
both academic and foreign policy audiences when discussing the nature and use 
of power. Our analysis of its evolution in the discourse on German foreign policy 
is guided by four conceptual insights.5   
 
First, ‘power’ is essential to agency. To be an agent in a meaningful sense one has 
to have some form of ‘power’, and different forms of power are associated with 
different forms of agency. In interstate relations, these forms are captured in role 
images such as ‘hegemon’, ‘great power’, ‘middle power’, etc. that states associate 
with or seek recognition for. And as noted earlier, a particular role generates 
expectations about corresponding behavior. That is, if a state is depicted as a 
particular kind of power, the expectation is that this state, or rather, its 
government is able and willing to act correspondingly.  Closely related, second, 
power is exercised. Power is often casually described as a property – i.e. one either 
has power or not. This makes it easy to think of it in terms of an aspiration, but it 
also misleads to think of power primarily in terms of resources. Yet power is the 
ability to use resources in an effective way, it is a process that connects resources 
to outcomes. Third, rather than seeing power simply emerging out of the 
mobilization of domestic resources, power can reside in and be expressed through 
                                                        
5 For extensive discussions of meanings and uses of ‘power’ see Baldwin (2012); Barnett and 
Duvall (2005); Berenskoetter (2007); Guzzini (1993; 2016).  
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international structures. In fact, power can be conceptualized as a structural 
phenomenon in which individual agents matter very little, their roles reduced to 
a function of a given script. However this extreme conception is not very plausible 
for depicting a state’s foreign policy. A more sensible reading highlights how 
agency is exercised through structural forces, including the ability to use them to 
one’s advantage, as captured in Susan Strange’s notion of structural power 
(Strange 1988; also Guzzini 1993).  
 
Fourth, for analysts of international politics, at least, power is best understood in 
relational terms. It is expressed not simply through behavior as such, in the ability 
to act in one way or another through the mobilization of domestic resources or 
international structures, but on the effect this has on Selves and Others and the 
configuration of a relationship. Crudely put, this expression can take two forms: 
(a) ‘power over’, which shows a hierarchical relationship marked by coercion and 
control. In this conception of power as, essentially, a form of domination, power 
shifts are seen as playing out in a zero-sum game, i.e. if one state gains ‘power over’ 
something, another loses. Very differently, the reading of (b) ‘power to/with’ 
depicts a form of power as productive, a creative or enabling force that emerges 
out of cooperation. It sees power relations as configurations in which all involved 
become empowered or, to stay with the game-theoretical language, it shows 
international relations as a positive-sum game.  
 
Equipped with this analytical framework we now can track the evolution of 
Germany as a ‘power’ in the foreign policy discourse. In doing so we expect that 
the meaning content of this role is affected not only by the geopolitical context in 
which Germany is situated but also by the historical context, providing it with a 
certain historical ‘baggage’, which together inform the formulation of an 
aspirational image, a role Germany should (want to) play. Furthermore, we expect 
that academically trained voices will formulate this concept through a particular 
theoretical (realist, liberal, etc) lens. A question kept in mind throughout, although 
not systematically explored, is whether advocacy of a particular concept is 
accompanied by an effort of applying it analytically and reflecting on its empirical 
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validity. In other words, is the use of certain role images of ‘German power’ 
grounded in actual measurement of German power?  
 
The evolution of Germany as a ‘power’ 
Constrained Power 
Conceptions of post-war Germany’s ‘power’ are usually formulated with reference 
to (i) the historical backdrop in which Germany has exercised power in extremely 
violent and destructive ways and (ii) an account of the current and future world 
in which Germany is situated and the ‘challenges’ this world poses. The historical 
experience of two World Wars and the responsibility for the Holocaust exerted, 
and continues to exert, a dominant influence on formulations of ‘German power’: 
It created a context in which ‘power’ had a ‘hard’ connotation and meant military 
aggression and dominance. Both within German society and in European 
collective memory more widely, a ‘powerful’ Germany was not seen as a good 
thing. Consequently, in the effort to define the identity of the ‘new’ Germany in 
opposition to the ‘old’ (pre-45) one, German foreign policy was not to be 
understood in terms of ‘power politics’. Germans were wary of having their state 
and its appearance associated with the very term, reflected in Hans-Peter 
Schwarz’ (1985) diagnosis of a ‘Forgetfulness of Power’, and in Gregor Schöllgen’s 
(1993) decision to entitle his book on German foreign policy ‘Afraid of Power’ (see 
also Hacke 1993). 
 
Correspondingly, most conceptions of German power during the Cold War 6 
highlighted the significant constraints on German foreign policy (Schwarz 1975; 
see also Hanrieder 1967; 1989). References were typically made to Germany’s 
precarious geopolitical position; its security dependence on the US; its 
decentralised and constrained political structure; its integration in European and 
transatlantic institutions and a significant amount of scepticism towards the ‘new’ 
Germany amongst its neighbours and allies, as well as in German media and 
society (Schwarz 1985; 1994). To be sure, the economic ‘miracle’ gave Germany 
significant clout as a trading state, prompting Chancellor Helmut Schmidt in 1969 
                                                        
6 In this period ‘Germany’ refers to the Federal Republic. 
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to describe Germany’s role in the world economic system as that of a ‘world 
power’ (cited in Hacke 1996: 10; see also Czempiel 1979). Yet such references 
were rare and paired with the New York Times’ characterization of Germany as 
“an economic giant, a political dwarf” (NYT 1971).  
 
There are basically two readings of Germany as a constrained power. For realist 
scholars like Morgenthau (1980), Schwarz (1985; 1994) and Schöllgen (1993), 
operating with a conception of power as control over military resources and the 
ability to make sovereign decisions, the constraints were a fundamental 
weakness. Morgenthau acknowledged that “truncated West Germany has become 
the most important economic and military power west of the Elbe River” yet 
emphasized its “inability to pursue an independent foreign policy” and saw dim 
prospects for an “active foreign policy” (Morgenthau 1980: 244-5). In the same 
vein, Schwarz argued that Germany’s integration into multilateral structures and 
security dependence on the US meant that the government was effectively unable 
to make sovereign decisions about the use of military force and impose its will on 
others (Schwarz 1985: 63-71, 116-7).  
 
In contrast, the concept of ‘tamed power’ developed by Peter Katzenstein (1997) 
highlights an entangled but mutually constitutive relationship between German 
power and its institutional context in Europe. Although the term was rarely used 
in German foreign policy discourse (but see Schwarz 1985; 1994; also Paterson 
2010), the underpinning concept appeared under different names (discussed 
later). Coming from a liberal constructivist angle, Katzenstein speaks of the 
“institutionalization of power” in Europe as taking “the hard edges off power 
relations” (Katzenstein 1997: 3). In this picture, Germany is portrayed as a ‘semi-
sovereign’ state that nevertheless exercises power, but “in multilateral, 
institutionally mediated systems” (Katzenstein 1997: 4). These systems allow 
states to project their power ‘softly’ while simultaneously being shaped by them 
(Katzenstein 1997: 3-6).7 As such, ‘tamed power’ highlights the enabling aspects 
                                                        
7 Katzenstein notes it is thus a mistake to decide between a simplistic view of a ‘Germanization’ of 
Europe and the vision of a ‘Europeanization’ of Germany. Instead he sees a more complicated and 
ambiguous pattern ‘linking Germany and Europe’ (Katzenstein, 1997: 1). 
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of integration and Germany using indirect institutional means to pursue its 
objectives, showing a more complex set of relationships in which Germany is also 
empowered and transformed.  
 
Civilian Power 
The notion of civilian power first appeared in François Duchêne’s much discussed 
reflection on Europe in 1973 (Duchêne 1973). Towards the end of the 1980s 
Hanns Maull adopted the concept from his friend and former superior at the 
International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) to capture what he considered 
to be the evolution of a different principal logic of world politics (see Maull 2014a: 
121-3). It subsequently entered both political (see Volmer 1998; Rinke 2006; 
Herkendell 2012) and academic discourse and was redefined and specified by a 
group of scholars around Maull (see Maull 2014a: 125-39; also Tewes 2002).   
 
The role image of ‘civilian power’ combines the idea of the trading state 
(Rosecrance 1986) with a commitment to a civilian, law-based, international 
order. Adopting Norbert Elias’ thesis of the civilizing process to the realm of 
international politics, the prefix signals a specific objective. It depicts foreign 
policy actors that seek to ‘civilize’ international relations through international 
cooperation, apply economic means and strengthen international law. Initially, 
Maull (1990) explicitly defined ‘civilian power’ in opposition to traditional 
(realist) readings of ‘great powers’. Applied to Germany and Japan, it reflected the 
perceived historical lesson that brute military force does not pay and emphasized 
the postwar experience of cooperation and influence through economic means. He 
presented it as the prototype of a “new type of international power”, reiterating 
Duchêne’s narrative of a ‘civilizing process’ in Europe and Rosecrance’s reflections 
on the evolution of the ‘trading state’ in a new era of growing interdependence. 
Maull not only argued that Germany and Japan had become civilian powers, he 
also used the concept to capture “a particular foreign policy orientation” he 
considered politically desirable in a changing world (Maull 2014a: 121-122). 
Indeed, civilian power can be read as an explicit commitment to multilateralism. 
In this sense, Henning Tewes presents it as a pragmatic-normative approach to 
international relations, “the prescription of new forms of international 
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governance geared toward an era in which nation states cannot unilaterally fulfill 
the tasks which once sustained their existence” (Tewes 2002: 11). Looking back, 
Maull notes “it was this normative dimension of the civilian power concept that 
made it politically attractive” (Maull 2014a: 125).   
 
With the end of the Cold War the concept became attractive in Germany not only 
because it acknowledged Germany’s status as an economically prosperous state 
and pictured its favorable position in an assumed liberal ‘New World Order’. The 
‘civilian power’ label also signaled a certain level of rehabilitation and acceptance 
of the ‘new’ Germany in the international realm. Most importantly, it mediated 
between the historical and the forward-looking aspect of a united Germany: on 
the one hand, the German state had significantly increased in size and formally 
regained its sovereignty, which required a role identity that acknowledged a more 
‘powerful’ player. This needed to be squared, on the other hand, with the 
aforementioned aversion against appearing ‘powerful’ and the awareness that its 
European neighbours did not want to see a German ‘return to power’. 
Contemplations whether unified Germany might now become a ‘world power’ 
were rejected as outdated realist phantasies (Wolf 1991). Maull’s use of the 
‘civilian power’ label caught on precisely because it captured that Germany was 
less constrained while signaling a commitment to non-militaristic and benign 
foreign policy. As such, the primary value of the ‘civilian power’ image was to give 
unified Germany a particular status and provide normative guidance for foreign 
policy in a liberal world, to constitute a new role identity that codified certain 
behavioral expectations (Maull 2014a: 125ff). 
 
That said, the concept remained sufficiently vague to invite different readings and, 
consequently, tensions. Some on the German left read the concept as a variation 
of the notion of Friedensmacht (‘power for peace’) (see Maull 2013; 2014; Volmer 
1998; Rinke 2006; Herkendell 2012) while others focused on the means 
dimension of economic measures as a core element (Linklater 2001). While this 
parallelism of normativity and economic interests explains much of its appeal in 
the German discourse, its malleability invited a tension between those who see a 
‘civilian power’ as an actor that exercises power exclusively through civilian 
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means, and those who see it as expressing a commitment to international order or 
a peaceful world, which does not rule out the use of military force. Thus, with 
Germany’s growing involvement in military missions in the 1990s, especially 
during the Kosovo conflict, a stronger concern for ‘international order’ was read 
into the concept, namely a project of ‘civilizing’ international relations by various 
means, including military (Maull 2000; Tewes 2002). This brought it closer to 
traditional Atlanticist claims about the West’s responsibility for maintaining 
liberal order (Maull 2013; 2014). While adjusting the concept in this way was a 
move to keep it useful, it also signified a break. Thus, when Kundnani (2014: 54) 
portrays Germany during the Kosovo conflict as an Ordnungsmacht which 
intervened “to maintain the global order”, it is difficult to see how this action 
“strengthened [Germany’s] claim to be a civilian power” as it was defined initially.  
 
The concept also can mislead into thinking that ‘civilian’ means are used only in 
productive and cooperative ways (in terms of ‘power to/with’), while they can just 
as easily be mobilized to sustain a hierarchy and can have coercive effects (in 
terms of ‘power over’). Yet, as noted earlier, in the German context the ‘civilian’ 
label expressed a behavioral principle designating non-military means and goals 
to alleviate any unease with the image of a unified and sovereign Germany as a 
‘power’. Because this unease was based on the historical memory that tied German 
power to military aggression and devastation, it was sufficient to highlight the 
commitment to ‘civilian’ means. Just as ‘hard’ power is conventionally understood 
in terms of military resources and their use, the contrasting image of ‘civilian’ 
power benefits from the evaluative shortcut that assumes its holder to act in 
benign or non-threatening ways. As such, the concept  described and proscribed a 
practice and, even more so, an attitude grounded in a foreign policy ‘culture of 
restraint’ (Berger 1998; Duffield 1998; Malici 2006). The fact that ‘civilian’ 
instruments can be used quite effectively to interfere in other states received little 
attention, also because the political appeal of the prefix sidelined the concept as a 
category of analysis. Indeed, we might contend that ‘civilian power’ was not 
designed for the purpose of carefully assessing how Germany actually exercises 
power in relational terms. While useful for projecting the image of a benign 
Germany to domestic and international audiences, it has little to offer when it 
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comes to evaluating the effects of a ‘civilian’ approach and the facets (presence or 
absence) of German power.8 
 
If ‘civilian power’ is a cultural orientation defining a set of desirable practices, why 
would the concept be replaced? This is ultimately a question of how deeply 
ingrained it is in the minds of the political elite (Maull 2014: 127-8), government 
bureaucracies and the German public more broadly (Brummer 2013), what 
circumstances keep it in place or reduce its appeal. Some argue that Germany’s 
practice of conducting foreign policy through economic means is dependent on 
the health of its economy, i.e. requires a condition of economic prosperity 
(Crawford 2007). Others note that acting as a ‘civilian power’ depends on the 
existence of a functioning liberal world order, an international environment of 
global governance with non-coercive and non-military means as principal and 
effective currencies. Again others claim that Germany’s ability to be a civilian 
power depends on US security guarantees, effectively portraying it as a form of 
‘free-riding’, as a luxury attitude that can only exist under a ‘hard power’ umbrella 
(Kagan 2002; Kundnani 2014).  
 
Hegemonic power 
With the gradual escalation of the Eurozone crisis since 2009 we can see the 
return of a stronger reflection of ‘power over’ in relation to Germany in political 
and academic discourse in the form of Germany as a hegemonic power. The 
discursive landscape is marked by two different readings, both using an 
assessment of Germany’s structural power in Europe as a starting point.  
 
One camp tends to be strongly prescriptive and sees Germany’s normative role in 
Europe as that of a benign hegemon similar to the role of the US during the first 
decades of the Cold War. According to this perspective, typically drawing 
conceptually on hegemonic stability theory in the tradition of Charles 
Kindleberger (1973; 1981), Germany has emerged as a hegemon in Europe and 
                                                        
8 Tewes (2002) presents a fruitful use to analyze German foreign policy towards Central and 
Eastern Europe in the 1990s, bringing it close to the concept of ‘normative power’. Yet, despite 
fleetingly mentioning Lukes, he does not really offer an analysis of the exercise of power.   
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should therefore accept its hegemonic status as a “special responsibility” 
(Bukovansky et al, 2012) and new role identity. Yet, while Germany is seen as 
structurally resembling a hegemon, it fails to embrace that role and is thus 
depicted as a ‘reluctant hegemon’ (Paterson 2011; Sikorski, 2011; Economist, 
2013; Bulmer and Paterson, 2013; 2019) unwilling to practice leadership 
(Kornelius 2010, 2015; Schönberger 2012, 2013). Voices within this camp, which 
tend to be based in Britain and the United States, see the main problem in 
Germany’s lack of will and/or strategic reflection and debate (see Economist, 
2013; Hyde-Price, 2015). For historical reasons, so the argument, Germans shy 
away from leadership and prefer to see their country as a bigger version of 
Switzerland instead of exercising the power needed for stability in Europe and in 
the international system. As a consequence, an economically and structurally 
‘German-dominated’ but crisis-ridden Europe is adrift without responsible 
leadership and direction. 
 
In the German discourse references to (benign) hegemony have been used only  
cautiously and with significant qualifications. While calls for a more proactive 
foreign policy have received support, Germans have typically been much more 
sceptical with regards to the country’s ability to fulfil a hegemonic role in Europe 
as envisioned in the Anglo-American discourse (see e.g. Link, 2012; 2013; 
Schwarzer and Lang, 2012; Harnisch, 2014). That said, conceptions of ‘leadership’ 
have gained some prominence in the German discourse in recent years, partly in 
reaction to Anglo-American views and demands (Harnisch and Schild, 2014). This 
stands in continuity of previous reflections on ‘Mitführungsmacht’ (see 
Haftendorn 2001: 445) and related labels such as ‘servant leader’ (Mangasarian 
and Techau 2017), ‘Zentralmacht’ (Schwarz 1994), ‘Führung aus der Mitte’ (von 
der Leyen 2015), ‘Macht in der Mitte’ (Münkler 2015) or as a ‘responsible power’ 
(Gauck 2014; Crossley-Frolick 2016; Giegerich and Terhalle 2016). The notion of 
Germany as a ‘leader’ expressed in these more recent discourses seems 
compatible with the proactive role of the benign hegemon. Yet its distinct 
character becomes visible when it spilled-over from the economic realm into the 
security/military realm, where German conceptions of leadership and power are 
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significantly more cooperative than the lone hegemon image typically found in the 
Anglo-American discourse.9   
 
The prescriptive ideal of the benign hegemon – or cooperative/joint leadership in 
German discourse – is contrasted by the image of a coercive hegemon. Here, 
Germany’s structural power is portrayed as a negative form of excessive 
dominance in Europe serving Germany’s narrow self-interests to the detriment of 
others (Anderson, 2012; Cafruny, 2015; Varoufakis, 2016). Some voices in this 
camp portray the EU, and the EU monetary system in particular, as a ‘tailor-made 
system’ from which Germany profits disproportionately and unduly after 
successfully uploading its own domestic structures to the European level. Others 
stress Germany’s dominant structural presence as a ‘powerhouse’ in the European 
economy producing, through extensive current account surplus, ‘negative 
externalities’ and various misallocations in Europe. Still others highlight 
Germany’s significant positional power in Europe as a large, populous and 
economically strong country located geographically advantageously in the center 
of Europe (‘Mittellage’) with extensive supply chains deep into Central and 
Eastern Europe. 10   
 
While in these structural accounts Germany can appear as exercising power 
unintentionally and even impersonally (see Gloannec, 2001), the coercive 
hegemon image often combines references to ‘structural dominance’ with a 
selection of statements or actions by particular government officials, prominently 
ranging from Foreign Minister Genscher’s recognition of Croatia in 1992 (see e.g. 
Crawford, 2007) to Finance Minister Schäuble’s role in negotiations with Greece 
during the Eurozone crisis (see e.g. Varoufakis, 2016) or Volker Kauder’s infamous 
remark at that time that ‘Jetzt wird in Europa Deutsch gesprochen’ (‘now Europe is 
speaking German’) (see e.g. Anderson, 2012). This image tends to conflate diverse 
aspects – structural arguments, negotiation tactics, disagreements over policy, 
                                                        
9 The cooperative approach is generally illustrated in Germany’s close collaboration with France 
(e.g., Schild, 2010; Fröhlich 2019) 
10 Kundnani (2014) sees Germany as the strongest European ‘geo-economic’ power but “too 
weak to be a hegemon”, hence taking a “position of semi-hegemony”. Kundnani reads this as a 
continuation of the ‘German question’. See also Guerot and Leonard (2011).  
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attempts to upload domestic policies to the European level, etc – all wrapped into 
a narrative that depicts a drastic change from Germany as a ‘submissive actor’ 
with a ‘European vocation’ (Genscher) to ‘a self-confident nation’ which pursues 
its national interests more directly and ruthlessly ‘without an inferiority complex’ 
(Schröder) to the evolution of a new coercive German hegemony in a ‘German 
Europe’ (Beck, 2012; Lever, 2017).11  
 
Overall, while the hegemony label became popular during the Eurozone crisis, in 
both its benign and coercive connotation it was (and remains) primarily used 
outside Germany. Yet even there it often remains conceptually rather shallow, 
never really engaging deeper understandings of hegemony based on possessing 
significantly more resources than the reference group combined with legitimacy, 
consent and the need of followers (Clark, 2011; Worth, 2015; Stritzel, 2018). 
Among German authors, the label is seen as problematic, if not dangerous, because 
it suggests a radical break from the role and foreign policy tradition established 
after the Second World War. Although the focus on economic affairs softens the 
image a little, within Germany the meaning of hegemony is historically tied to 
practices of coercive domination. Thus, it does not easily lend itself to an 
aspirational image. If anything, due to its negative connotation the image serves 
as a warning against appearing dominant in Europe not least to avoid hostility, 
resistance and balancing against Germany. At the same time, the notion of joint 
leadership has gradually been accepted and reflected upon in the German 
discourse. Especially in the security/military realm German voices have joined 
into the familiar Anglo-American call for a more ‘proactive’ foreign policy and an 
increase in defense spending (Mangasarian and Techau 2017; von Marschall 




                                                        
11 For studies that argue that this narrative is heavily distorted, see Roos (2012); Harnisch 
(2014). On the return of historical narratives of the ‘ugly German’ during the Eurozone crisis, see 
e.g. Bayer (2015). The lack of analytical clarity is especially apparent in discussions that 
(deliberately) blur the conceptual and political argument, such as Kundnani (2011; 2014). For a 
conceptual critique of Kundnani’s and Szabo’s reflection on Germany as a geo-economic power, 
see Maull (2018) and Stritzel (2018). 
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With ‘civilian power’ stretched to the limit and the ‘hegemon’ image not finding 
much of a following in Germany’s foreign policy discourse, another concept has 
emerged: Gestaltungsmacht. 12  While the image stands in the continuity of 
previous reflections and related labels on ‘leadership’, in the specific setting of 
German discourse it can be seen as a ‘smart pleonasm’ (Hellmann 2013: 17) which 
gives ‘power’ a positive connotation (‘Gestalten’) while avoiding negative 
connotations of ‘Großmacht’, ‘Weltmacht’, ‘hegemon’ and ‘Führungsmacht’. In its 
English translation as ‘shaping power’ the label seems to have its first appearance 
in 2000 (but see already Schwarz 1994), in a book written by three British 
scholars who drew on Arnold Wolfers to argue that German power is based on the 
successful diplomacy of shaping its regional, i.e. Europen, milieu (Bulmer et al. 
2000). 13  Hanns Maull then gave the term a prominent place in an essay that 
strongly criticizes the German government for an insufficient ‘will to shape’, 
resulting in ‘an erosion of shaping power’ for German foreign policy (Maull 2003). 
A number of years later, the government published a strategic document in which 
the concept of ‘shaping power’ is used to conceptualize Germany’s engagement 
with emerging powers of the Global South (Bundesregierung 2012).14 By then, the 
term was increasingly referred to in policy documents and newspaper articles 
such as by Sandschneider (2012) and in an important multi-author report on 
German foreign policy jointly published by the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik 
and the German Marshall Fund (SWP/GMF 2013). The concept was also hailed by 
prominent external observers like Stephen Szabo who sees Germany as a ‘geo-
economic shaping power’ (Szabo 2015, 2017), and found its way into documents 
by the Foreign Office (AA 2015) and the 2016 Whitebook (discussed below). 
 
All texts advocating the image use it in distinctly aspirational terms, flanked by 
diagnoses of a ‘changing environment’ and associated pressures: (a) an 
observation that the world has changed and poses new challenges that require a 
‘more active’ German foreign policy, and (b) the demand by allies for Germany to 
                                                        
12 There is no straightforward translation into English, the term can be understood as the power 
to shape, form, configure, or construct. We adopt the commonly used term ‘shaping power’.  
13 That same year, Ralf Dahrendorf claimed in an interview “Europe has no Gestaltungsmacht” 
(Welt 2000). 
14 Szabo (2015: 143) notes that the concept was channeled into the German Foreign Office by 
Thomas Bagger, head of Policy Planning under both Westerwelle and Steinmeier. 
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‘step up’ and ‘take more responsibility’, usually (but not only) in terms of 
increasing military spending and involvement abroad. These diagnoses, also 
prominent in Frank-Walter Steinmeier’s recollections of his second term as 
Foreign Minister (Steinmeier 2016), share a narrative of multiple crises in a 
changing world that require Germany to become ‘more active’ and assume 
‘leadership’. In policy interventions and newspaper articles ‘shaping power’ is 
thus typically used as a placeholder for ‘active engagement’ and for criticizing 
German foreign policy for no or insufficient ‘activity’. This is usually anchored in a 
fleeting reference to its ‘actual power’ according to which Germany had to be 
‘more active’ in ‘shaping’ the world around it. In these cases, the term appears as 
little more than a new label for repackaging familiar complaints and 
demands/agendas and is reminiscent of the prescriptive ideal of a ‘benign’ but 
‘reluctant’ hegemon. 15  
 
Thus far, there has not been a wider move to establish ‘shaping power’ as a distinct 
concept, perhaps also because advocates disagree on what a ‘shaping power’ 
should do/be. It is variably defined as pursuing ones own economic interests 
rather than being driven by values, as showing ‘flexibility’ and not being 
constrained by multilateralism or cherished bilateral relations (Sandschneider 
2012), or as pursuing a ‘networked’ approach of investing in relationships and 
reform of international organizations (SWP/GMF), especially using economic 
networks to solve problems (Szabo 2017). Markus Kaim claimed that ‘Germany is 
becoming a shaping power in the Middle East’ when the government was sending 
six Tornado reconnaissance jets to Syria (Zeit 2015) and Dirk Messner used the 
term to discuss challenges and opportunities in advancing sustainable 
development on a global level (Messner 2015). Given this array of uses, it is 
instructive to take a brief look at the two strategic documents by the German 
government, the aforementioned 2012 document ‘Globalisierung gestalten – 
Partnerschaften ausbauen – Verantwortung teilen’ and the 2016 Whitebook issued 
by the German Ministry of Defense.  
 
                                                        
15 Or the image of a ‘Weltmacht wider Willen’, revived by a lead article in Der Spiegel (2018)  
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In the 2012 document, German power is mainly expressed through a global 
governance model of power in a complex, dynamic and polycentric world of 
globalization to which states must constantly adapt. In this world, power is 
diffused and entails/requires influencing and shaping policy processes with other 
actors that are willing and able to engage in processes of building coalitions and 
shaping an ‘evolving consensus’. In acknowledging the limited ability to define or 
‘impose’ policy outcomes similar to the previous civilian power label, 
Gestaltungsmacht is essentially defined as kooperative Mitgestaltungsmacht.16 The 
term is difficult to translate literally but it appears in frequent references to 
Germany as a ‘Mitgestalter’ (page 7), ‘Förderer’ (page 8), or ‘Gestaltungspartner’ 
(page 59), which almost suggests that Germany is just ‘assisting’ in broader 
‘shaping’ processes, rather than taking a leading role.  
 
Although the term is not used in the final document of the 2016 Whitebook, the 
strategic treatise for German security policy published by the Ministry of Defense 
roughly every decade,17 the concept has a central function in the presentation of 
Germany’s ‘new role’ and is expressed in prominent frames regarding Germany’s 
‘claim to shape’ (Gestaltungsanspruch), the ‘realms (in and through which) to 
shape’ (Gestaltungsbereiche) and its ‘ability to shape’ (Gestaltungsfähigkeit) 
(Weissbuch 2016). 18  The governance model of ‘foreign policy making in a 
globalized world’ expressed in the 2012 document is here paraphrased in terms 
of movements within sets of networks (Netzwerkansatz), the preferred term in 
Germany’s official security discourse for several years, and as closely entangled 
with interests of and policies by friends and allies. While the Whitebook makes 
several references to leadership, it qualifies this as assuming roles in 
multinational peace operations as a ‘framework nation’ or as a ‘lead and host-
nation’ (Weissbuch 2016: 68). Where the document does articulate an 
autonomous ‘Gestaltungsanspruch’ of Germany (p. 138) this is embedded in 
                                                        
16 This is slightly misrepresented particularly in Hellmann (2013) but also (2016). 
17 The draft of the Whitebook reportedly explicitly declared Germany a ‘shaping power’ (FAZ 
2016). 
18 The 2006 Whitebook already attributed Germany ‘an important role in the shaping of Europe 
and beyond’ (Weissbuch 2006: 8). 
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references to increased expectations from partners that generate the ‘duty’ and 
‘responsibility’ for Germany to be more active.  
 
Conceptually speaking, these documents present Gestaltungsmacht as a creative 
activity that involves encouraging and facilitating cooperation without doing so 
from a position of superiority. Acknowledging the ‘reality’ of a stronger Germany 
and the demand for taking on more responsibility, shaping power occurs in a 
polycentric and complex world in which no single actor can provide public goods 
unilaterally. So while elements of the benign hegemony discourse are visible, 
Gestaltungsmacht does not occur within a configuration of hierarchy, but within 
cooperative and networked relationships. As Foreign Minister Heiko Maas 
emphasized in the Bundestag “our international shaping power stands and falls, 
above all, with the coherence/solidarity [Geschlossenheit] of Europe” (Maas 2018). 
Blending into Mitgestaltungsmacht, it is a clear expression of ‘power to/with’. So 
rather than reading ‘shaping power’ as a semantic cousin of ‘great power’ and 
embedded in the realist paradigm (Hellmann et al 2016: 216), there appear to be 
more overlaps with ‘civilian power’ (Maull 2018). That said, there are also notable 
differences. Whereas in Maull’s account civilian powers were boldly portrayed as 
‘prototypes’ of a new type of actor in a liberal world where military power has lost 
much of its appeal, the Gestaltungsmacht role lacks this optimistic and ambitious 
connotation. Instead, it is situated in a polycentric world where liberal order has 
been exposed as fragile and, thus, is concerned with ensuring the proper 
functioning of a ‘rule-based international order’. The documents also note that 
Germany’s ability to ‘shape’ are limited, with the Whitebook cautioning that 
Germany is currently ‘neither sufficiently attuned nor prepared in a sustainable 
manner’ to live up to this role (Weissbuch 2016: 137, also 23). In this sense, 
shaping power does have a ‘realistic’ tenor.  
 
Conclusion 
The analysis has shown a gradual evolution of the notion of Germany as a ‘power’, 
with the emergence of each role image influenced by (a reading of) the 
international political context Germany finds itself in: for the constrained power 
image, this context was a post-war system that (deliberately) limited German 
 20 
power; the civilian power role presented unified Germany as part and parcel of a 
process of positive change in a liberal post-Cold War world; the hegemon image 
expressed ambivalence of Germany regaining a ‘central place’ in Europe, with the 
negative connotation coming to fore during the Eurocrisis; and the shaping power 
label situates Germany in a challenging and changing (post-American) world, 
which it has to adjust to and navigate with others. Not surprisingly, the European 
context is central to all these role images. While the evolution shows a trend 
towards depicting a ‘stronger’ Germany, there is notable overlap amongst the 
concepts underpinning these role images (with the obvious exception of the 
coercive hegemon). New labels do not signify a radical replacement of the previous 
one. Instead, the meaning content has changed gradually. 
 
At least among German authors, acceptable role images portray German ‘power’ 
as benign and cooperative and, hence, must contrast with the historical memory 
of Germany as a dominant and violent force. Thus, these role images have a 
significant normative dimension and are often depicted as an aspiration. Future 
research might want to assess more carefully to what extent German political 
elites actually identify with these roles and draw on them to guide and justify their 
foreign policy positions/decisions. Carrying this further, it would be important to 
know to what extent a particular role is recognized externally, i.e. by other 
governments. Noteworthy in this regard is that the formulation of all the role 
images outlined here is tied to an understanding what Germany’s power ‘actually’ 
is or should be. This may sound trivial, yet the link is not always clear. In fact, the 
texts advancing these role images tend to convey simplistic (if not misleading) 
understandings of ‘power’ in terms of resources and practices. Much of their 
meaning is drawn from the prefix (constrained, civilian, shaping, etc), with little 
attention paid to the concept of power, in particular its expression in relational 
form. One might argue that political discourse does not need such deeper 
understanding, yet intuitive associations are not enough if these images are used 
for guiding, predicting and assessing the impact of foreign policy practices.  
 
This is also important for the question whether in shaping power we are currently 
witnessing the emergence of a new basic concept for German foreign policy. We 
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agree with Hellmann (2017) that Gestaltungsmacht has intuitive appeal, as 
Gestalten gives ‘power’ a positive connotation. The documents analyzed above 
indicate that ‘shaping power’ is a form of ‘power with/to’, a creative force that 
works through cooperation and which can be contrasted with a ‘power over’ 
configuration. Yet while it may nicely tie in with existing labels and their 
conceptual webs, ‘shaping power’ needs a distinct profile to gain further traction. 
It has to offer more than a pragmatic way of navigating a complex world; it also 
needs a normative vision. Moreover, its political, policy-oriented expressions 
should be complemented by careful theoretical treatments of it as something 
relational and dynamic. That way, Gestaltungsmacht may become not only a 
substantive role image that can position and guide German foreign policy, but also 
a useful analytical category that can show us how ‘shaping’ takes place, who 
‘shapes’ and what is being ‘shaped’. And then we might see that Germany has been 
a ‘shaping power’ all along. 
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